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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge. 
 
The issue we must decide in this appeal is whether an 
excess insurer (here, INA) was an indispensable party 
under Rule 19(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure so 
as to cause the dismissal of certain of the Appellant's 
claims when INA was not joined in this action against 
various other excess insurers. We hold that INA was not an 
indispensable party and accordingly that the claims should 
not have been dismissed. We therefore reverse. 
 
I. 
 
Appellant Koppers Company, Inc. ("Koppers") appeals the 
district court's dismissal of its claims against Appellees, 
certain underwriters from Lloyd's of London and certain 
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London market insurance companies (hereinafter, "the 
London Insurers"), pertaining to seven (7) insurance 
policies that the London Insurers issued to Koppers to 
provide coverage for various environmental property 
damages that occurred from 1960-65 (hereinafter, "the 
1960-65 policies"). The district court dismissed the claims 
relating to these policies because Koppers failed to join two 
other insurers -- Indemnity Insurance of North America 
and Insurance Company of North America (collectively, 
"INA") -- as indispensable parties pursuant to Rule 19(b) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
 
II. 
 
As we have set forth the facts of the underlying dispute 
in an earlier opinion, see Koppers Co., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440, 1444 (3d Cir. 1996), we recite only 
the facts pertinent to the issues before us here. 
 
Koppers is a large manufacturing company based in 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. In the 1980s, federal and state 
agencies brought claims against Koppers based on 
environmental contamination at approximately 150 plant 
and disposal sites. Although Koppers had purchased 
insurance from several insurance companies, all of the 
insurers initially denied coverage for these claims when 
Koppers sought indemnification. Accordingly, in 1985, 
Koppers sued its two (2) primary comprehensive insurers 
for breach of contract in federal court, based upon diversity 
of citizenship. 
 
In 1988, Koppers amended its complaint to sue other 
primary insurers and several excess insurers. Excess 
insurers -- such as the London Insurers in this case -- are 
insurers who contract to provide coverage only when the 
amount of the claim is beyond that of a primary insurer. In 
amending its complaint, however, Koppers decided not to 
sue INA (an excess insurer) because INA is a Pennsylvania 
company and joining it to the instant action would have 
defeated complete diversity. Thus, instead of suing INA in a 
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federal forum, Koppers initiated suit in Pennsylvania state 
court over the same insurance claims.1  
 
In July 1994, the London Insurers filed a Motion to 
Dismiss claims pertaining to the 1960-65 policies because 
Koppers failed to join INA pursuant to Rule 19 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The London Insurers 
claimed that the relationship between the coverage that 
they provided and the coverage that INA provided 
concerning the 1960-65 policies made INA an indispensable 
party to the federal suit. 
 
On October 20, 1994, without comment, the district 
court granted the London Insurers' Motion to Dismiss. 
Koppers filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the district 
court denied that motion on March 24, 1995. As a result, 
Koppers brought suit against the London Insurers relating 
to the 1960-65 policies by adding them as defendants in 
the state court action against INA. 
 
After the initial dismissal of Koppers' claims against the 
London Insurers pertaining to the 1960-65 policies, all of 
the defendant insurers except for the London Insurers 
settled with Koppers before trial. Thus, following the 
dismissal and settlement, the only remaining claims in the 
case were those against the London Insurers for the period 
from the 1940s to 1959 and 1966 to the 1970s. See 
Koppers, 98 F.3d at 1444. 
 
In April-May 1995, the district court conducted a trial 
over Koppers' claims against the remaining defendants (the 
London Insurers) but the court limited the scope of that 
trial to policies that provided coverage from late 1953 until 
January 1960. The district court further limited the scope 
of the trial to only eighteen of the contaminated sites. 
Following a three week trial, the jury awarded Koppers $70 
million. See id. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. During the period in question, Koppers' primary insurance carrier was 
Aetna which was liable for $50,000 for each occurrence. As an excess 
carrier, INA then became liable for $1,000,000 per occurrence. The 
London Insurers thus became liable for amounts in excess of 
$1,050,000. 
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On July 20, 1995, pursuant to Rule 54(b), the district 
court certified as final for interlocutory appeal the part of 
its judgment relating to the claims litigated at the jury trial, 
noted above. Although Koppers cross-appealed, it did not 
challenge the district court's decision to dismiss the 1960- 
65 policy claims against the London Insurers. 
 
On appeal, in reversing the district court's method of 
apportioning liability, we commented that 
 
       the district court would not need to determine whether 
       the non-settling pre-1971 policies were triggered 
       because the London Insurers concede -- against their 
       interests -- that all of Koppers' policies up to 1971 (the 
       date from which pollution exclusion clauses have 
       appeared in all the policies) were triggered. 
 
Id. at 1456. In addition, in a footnote, we suggested that 
INA was not a necessary party for a proper adjudication of 
the claims involved in this dispute: 
 
       We recognize that some of Koppers' insurers are not 
       part of this action because they are non-diverse with 
       the plaintiff. Under [Gould Inc. v. Continental Gas, 585 
       A.2d 16 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)], however, these insurers 
       need not participate in the case in order for the district 
       court to determine their apportioned shares of liability 
       for purposes of reducing the judgment against the 
       London Insurers. See 585 A.2d at 19 (stating that 
       court need only look at policies' terms and limits). Of 
       course, any determination that these policies were 
       triggered would not be binding or preclusive against 
       the absent insurers in future litigation because they 
       are not parties here. We note also that the London 
       Insurers' interests are aligned with those of the absent 
       insurers: each would like to prove that the absent 
       insurers' policies were not triggered. For the London 
       Insurers, such a determination would increase the 
       settling insurers' shares (thereby decreasing the 
       London Insurers' liability), and the absent insurers 
       would naturally like to avoid a determination of liability 
       in the first place. 
 
Id. n.21. 
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Prompted by our intimation that INA was not an 
indispensable party, Koppers moved to reinstate the 
dismissed claims pertaining to the 1960-65 policies. 
Essentially, then, Koppers requested the district court to 
reconsider its earlier decision which had dismissed the 
claims pertaining to the 1960-65 policies on the grounds 
that INA was an indispensable party. On June 10, 1997, 
the district court denied this motion from the bench, ruling: 
 
       I think that's the law of the case[.] It could have been 
       appealed at the time the rest of this case went up and 
       therefore, I'm going to deny the motion to reinstate any 
       claims. I'm not going to listen to any arguments, I'm 
       just going to just deny it. 
 
Tr. June 10, 1997, at 2. 
 
Thereafter, Koppers moved for certification under Rule 
54(b). Complying with the requirements set forth in Allis- 
Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 360 (3d 
Cir. 1975), the district court granted that motion on July 
15, 1997, and at the same time formally denied Koppers' 
Motion to Reinstate the claims that had been dismissed. 
 
III. 
 
As a threshold matter, we must address a motion by the 
London Insurers urging this Court to dismiss the instant 
appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 
 
The London Insurers contend that the dismissal of the 
1960-65 claims ("the dismissal order") becamefinal and 
appealable when the district court entered a final judgment 
over the litigated claims on July 20, 1995. The London 
Insurers claim that the dismissal order merged with the 
final judgment at that time. Thus, they argue that Koppers 
should have appealed the dismissal order then, and by 
failing to do so, Koppers waived its right to appeal that 
dismissal at the present time. 
 
Koppers counters that this Court does have appellate 
jurisdiction as there was no appealable order concerning 
the dismissal of the 1960-65 policies until the district court 
certified this issue under Rule 54(b). Koppers points out 
that the appeal of the July 20, 1995 judgment concerned 
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different policies than those at issue here as the present 
appeal specifically addresses the dismissed claims. 
Furthermore, Koppers argues that as there is still no final 
judgment over all of the claims in the instant case, the 
"merger rule" does not apply.2 We agree. 
 
Rule 54(b) provides: 
 
       When more than one claim for relief is presented in an 
       action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, 
       or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are 
       involved, the court may direct the entry of a final 
       judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the 
       claims or parties only upon an express determination 
       that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
       express direction for the entry of judgment. In the 
       absence of such determination and direction, any order 
       or other form of decision, however designated, which 
       adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and 
       liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not 
       terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, 
       and the order or other form of decision is subject to 
       revision at any time before the entry of judgment 
       adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities 
       of all the parties. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (emphasis added). As the Rule 54(b) 
certification pertaining to the July 20, 1995 order did not 
encompass the claims involving the 1960-65 policies, the 
Rule 54(b) certification did not -- indeed, could not -- 
implicate those claims.3 Contrary to what the London 
Insurers argue, there was no final order from which 
Koppers could have appealed. Thus, Koppers did not waive 
its right to appeal this issue. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Under the "merger rule," prior interlocutory orders merge with the 
final judgment in a case, and the interlocutory orders (to the extent that 
they affect the final judgment) may be reviewed on appeal from the final 
order. See In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 706 (3d Cir. 
1996). 
 
3. The July 20, 1995 order concerned only eighteen (18) sites and 
insurance policies providing coverage from 1953-60. See Order July 20, 
1995 at 2-4. 
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The London Insurers have not brought to the Court's 
attention nor have we found any cases that have held that 
a district court could not enter a Rule 54(b) certification 
under delayed circumstances such as those present in this 
matter. Accordingly, we conclude that this Court has 
appellate jurisdiction over the instant matter.4 
 
Accordingly, we now address the merits of the dispute at 
hand -- whether, in fact, INA was an indispensable party 
under Rule 19(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5 
We exercise plenary review over a district court's 
determination that a party's joinder is necessary under 
Rule 19(a). See Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc. v. Shepard 
Niles, Inc., 11 F.3d 399, 404 (3d Cir. 1993). We review a 
district court's ruling that a party is indispensable under 
Rule 19(b), however, for abuse of discretion. See id. at 403. 
 
IV. 
 
The London Insurers contend that INA is a necessary 
(and indispensable) party and thus that the district court 
properly dismissed the claims pertaining to the 1960-65 
policies. The London Insurers claim that they cannot be 
held liable to pay on their excess policies unless and until 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Along the same lines, the London Insurers also argue that because 
Koppers failed to appeal the district court's dismissal of the claims 
pertaining to the 1960-65 policies, Koppers did not preserve this issue 
and the district court's dismissal became the law of the case. This 
argument fails for the very reasons that we conclude that this Court has 
appellate jurisdiction. As the initial Rule 54(b) certification did not 
encompass the dismissal of the claims pertaining to the 1960-65 policies, 
Koppers could not have raised this issue in the prior appeal. Cf. United 
States v. U.S. Smelting Co., 339 U.S. 186, 198-99 (1950) (holding that 
the law of the case did not bar appeal despite party's failure to raise 
issue in a prior interlocutory appeal, although party could have raised 
issue in that prior appeal). Moreover, the district court's reference to 
"law 
of the case" cannot bind this Court on appeal. See Messenger v. 
Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912). 
 
5. In response to the London Insurers' Motion to Dismiss for lack of 
appellate jurisdiction, Koppers filed a Motion for Attorneys' Fees and 
Costs incurred in opposing that motion in this Court. Koppers has not 
furnished us with a basis for granting its motion for fees and costs. We 
will therefore deny Koppers' motion. 
 
                                8 
  
the underlying insurers -- including INA -- have paid or 
have been held liable to pay the full amount of their 
underlying policies. The London Insurers submit that their 
policies are "directly excess to [the INA policies] and 
contingent upon their liability under them," Appellee's Br. 
at 20, and that payment or liability under the underlying 
policies is a condition precedent to any obligations that the 
London Insurers might incur. In support, the London 
Insurers point to the following passage quoted from the 
issued policies: 
 
       [L]iability shall attach to the Underwriters only after 
       the Underlying Umbrella Insurers have paid or have 
       been held liable to pay the full amount of their 
       respective ultimate net loss liability . . . . 
 
App. 343 (Policy No. 60/473/3 at 1). Thus, the London 
Insurers maintain that the district court could not impose 
liability upon them without INA being a party to the 
litigation at hand. The London Insurers rely upon City of 
Littleton v. Commercial Union Assurance Company, 133 
F.R.D. 159 (D. Colo. 1990) (holding that absent primary 
insurers were indispensable parties when defendant excess 
insurers' policies were dependent upon whether the 
primary insurers' policies provided coverage), in support of 
their argument that underlying insurers are indispensable 
parties in cases involving excess insurers. 
 
In response, Koppers asserts that the district court erred 
in determining that INA was an indispensable party under 
Rule 19(b) because INA is not, in fact, a necessary party 
under Rule 19(a). See Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc. v. 
Shepard Niles, Inc., 11 F.3d 399, 405 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating 
that a court's determination that a party is necessary is a 
"necessary predicate" to its determination that a party is 
indispensable). Contrary to the London Insurers' position, 
Koppers claims that the London Insurers' policies are not 
contingent upon nor dependent upon INA's obligations 
under its insurance policies, as the London Insurers' 
policies do not incorporate the terms of INA's policies and 
do not make the London Insurers' obligations to pay 
contingent upon whether INA pays its claims. Indeed, 
Koppers argues that the plain language of the policies 
establishes that the London Insurers' liability is 
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independent from any liability incurred by INA. To the 
extent that the London Insurers assert otherwise, Koppers 
submits that the London Insurers improperly rely upon 
cover notes rather than provisions in actual policies.6 
 
Koppers also claims that INA's policy is not an 
"Underlying Umbrella Policy" and is not identified as such, 
so that the London Insurers' obligations are not dependent 
upon nor contingent upon INA's policy being paid. Rather, 
Koppers argues that the London Insurers' policies provide 
coverage only in excess of what is provided by INA's 
policies. As a result, Koppers contends that INA is not a 
necessary nor an indispensable party to the instant 
dispute, as the London Insurers' obligations can be 
determined fairly and properly without INA being a party. 
Indeed, Koppers points to this Court's earlier observation 
that the district court could determine the scope of the 
London Insurers' liability without INA being a party to the 
instant litigation. See Koppers, 98 F.3d at 1456 n.21. 
Accordingly, Koppers argues that complete relief can be 
granted in INA's absence, INA will not be prejudiced by the 
adjudication of the present matter, and that the London 
Insurers run no risk of incurring multiple or inconsistent 
obligations as a result of INA's absence. 
 
Subsection (a) of Rule 197 addresses the issue of whether 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Cover notes are documents that a broker issues to an insured to 
notify the insured that an insurance policy has been obtained as is in 
effect. See Decl. Michael Jackson at 3 (P 6). As the cover note is not 
issued by the insurers but rather by an insurance broker, "insurers in 
the London Market typically do not recognize a cover note as binding 
upon them." Id. 
 
7. Rule 19 governs the joinder of parties. It provides: 
 
       (a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to 
       service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of 
       jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined 
as 
       a party in the action if (1) in the person's absence complete 
relief 
       cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person 
       claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so 
       situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence 
       may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability 
to 
       protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already 
parties 
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a party should be joined as a "necessary" party. See 
Janney, 11 F.3d at 404. Subsection (b) concerns the issue 
of whether a party is an "indispensable" party. In reviewing 
a district court's determination pursuant to Rule 19, we 
must first determine whether a party is a necessary party 
to the dispute. See id. If the party is determined to be a 
necessary party but cannot be joined because such joinder 
would defeat diversity, it must then be determined whether 
the absent party is an indispensable party. See id. 
 
Rule 19(a) states that a party is necessary if either (1) the 
present parties will be denied complete relief in the absence 
of the party to be joined, or (2) the absent party will suffer 
some loss or be put at risk of suffering such a loss if not 
joined. As Rule 19(a) is stated in the disjunctive, if either 
subsection is satisfied, the absent party is a necessary 
party that should be joined if possible. Under Rule 19(a)(1), 
we first address whether the parties can be afforded 
complete relief in the absence of the non-joined party. We 
hold that they can. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or 
       otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed 
interest. 
       If the person has not been so joined, the court shall order that 
the 
       person be made a party. If the person should join as a plaintiff 
but 
       refuses to do so, the person may be made a defendant, or, in a 
       proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects 
to 
       venue and joinder of that party would render the venue of the 
action 
       improper, that party shall be dismissed from the action. 
 
       (b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder not Feasible. If a 
       person as described in subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be made 
       a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good 
       conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, 
or 
       should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as 
       indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: 
       first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence 
       might be prejudicial to the person or those already parties; 
second, 
       the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by 
the 
       shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened 
       or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's 
       absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have 
an 
       adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 (West 1998). 
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In order to determine whether the parties can be afforded 
complete relief in the absence of INA, we turn to the 
contract provisions which governed the 1960-65 policies. 
Policy No. 60/473/2 is the "Umbrella Policy" upon which all 
of the disputed policies at issue rely to define the scope and 
the terms of the London Insurers coverage and liability. See 
Decl. Michael Jackson at 4-7. Policy No. 60/473/2 
explicitly provides: 
 
       Nothing herein shall be construed to make this policy 
       subject to the terms, conditions, and limitations of 
       other insurance. 
 
App. 275 (Condition L). In addition, Policy No. 60/473/2 
states: 
 
       It is a condition of this policy that the policy or policies 
       referred to in the attached "Schedule of Underlying 
       Insurance" shall be maintained in full effect during the 
       currency of this policy except for any reduction of the 
       aggregate limit or limits contained therein solely by 
       payment of claims in respect of accidents and/or 
       occurrences occurring during the period of this policy. 
       Failure of the Assured to comply with the foregoing shall 
       not invalidate this policy but in the event of such failure, 
       the Underwriters shall only be liable to the same extent 
       as they would have been had the Assured complied 
       with the said condition. 
 
App. 276 (Condition S) (emphasis added). Moreover, the 
loss payable clause of Policy No. 60/473/2 reads, in 
pertinent part: 
 
       Liability under this policy with respect to any 
       occurrence shall not attach unless and until the 
       Assured, or the Assured's underlying insurer, shall 
       have paid the amount of the underlying limits on 
       account of such occurrence. 
 
App. 274 (Condition J) (emphasis added). 
 
Our reading of the Koppers' policies requires a total of 
$1,050,000 to be paid by either Koppers or its underlying 
insurance carrier -- in this case Aetna and INA-- before 
any liability of the London Insurers is triggered. Our 
understanding in this respect is that the London Insurers' 
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excess policy has, in effect, a $1,050,000 deductible 
amount before any payment must be made pursuant to the 
policy's terms. We thus conclude that insofar as liability 
under the London Policies is concerned, complete relief can 
be accorded to the parties present to this litigation without 
the joinder of INA. Accordingly, we hold that INA is not a 
necessary party under Rule 19(a)(1). In addition to the fact 
that complete relief is available, INA's ability to protect its 
interests will not be impaired or impeded by the disposition 
of the action in its absence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(i). 
By the same token, under Rule 19(a)(2)(ii), the London 
Insurers face no risk of multiple or otherwise inconsistent 
obligations as a result of INA's absence from this action. 
 
As we noted above, the Limits of Liability section of Policy 
No. 60/473/2 provides that liability does not attach to the 
London Insurers unless a claim exceeds at least 
$1,050,000. This provision underscores the independence 
between any liability that the London Insurers have under 
their policies and any liability that may result from INA's 
own policy coverage. To the extent that the London Insurers 
rely upon the cover notes to "stand as clear evidence of the 
fundamental structure" of the insurance coverage provided 
by the respective excess insurance policies, such reliance is 
misplaced.8 Appellee's Br. at 23. By their own terms, the 
cover notes became void when the actual insurance policies 
were issued. See App. 37 ("This cover note shall be 
automatically terminated and voided by delivery of policy or 
certificate of insurance to the Assured.") 
 
As we have concluded that INA is not a necessary party 
under Rule 19(a), INA cannot be an indispensable party 
under Rule 19(b). See Janney, 11 F.3d at 405. Accordingly, 
the district court erred in dismissing Koppers' claims 
pertaining to the 1960-65 policies for failure to join INA as 
an indispensable party.9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We note that under Pennsylvania law, if the language of an insurance 
policy is ambiguous, the ambiguous language is construed against the 
drafter. See Board of Pub. Educ. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 709 A.2d 
910, 1998 WL 111558, at 2 (Pa. Super. Ct. Mar. 16, 1998). 
 
9. We have considered the following issues that the London Insurers 
have raised on appeal and have found them to be without merit: the risk 
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V. 
 
In sum, as we conclude that INA is not a necessary and 
therefore not an indispensable party to the instant action, 
we will reverse the district court's dismissal of Koppers' 
claims relating to the 1960-65 policies and remand for 
further appropriate proceedings. 
 
A True Copy: 
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_________________________________________________________________ 
 
of duplicative litigation over identical issues in both state and federal 
fora; reinstating the 1960-65 policy claims weighs against judicial 
economy as INA policies would have to be analyzed in both state and 
federal courts; the district court cannot grant complete relief because it 
has no jurisdiction over INA; this Court should affirm under the doctrine 
of Wilton v. Seven Falls, 515 U.S. 277 (1995) (holding that a 
discretionary standard governs a district court's decision to stay a 
federal declaratory judgment action during the pendency of parallel state 
court proceedings). 
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